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"We want your money, not your two cents." -Joe Paterno 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 20, 2011, the University of Connecticut's ("UConn") athletic department 
received a scathing letter from major donor Robert Burton. 1 Burton, a highly successful printing 
industry executive, has donated over $7 million to support both academic and athletic programs 
at the University.2 A former college football player and NFL draft pick, Bln1on shares a love of 
football with his three sons, one of whom served as team captain for the Huskies in 1999.3 
While he has contributed to UConn academics by establishing two endowed scholarship :ftmds, it 
was Burton's $2.5 million gift towards the construction of a new $50 million on-campus football 
1 The portions of Burton's January 19,2011 letter to former UConn athletic director Jeff Hathaway that are of 
particular relevance to this Note read: 
''[A]s the largest donor in the UConn football program .. .I told you that I wanted to be involved in 
the hiring process for the new coach. I also gave you my insight about who would be a good fit for the 
head coaching position as well as who would not ... For someone who has given over $7,000,000 to the 
football program/university, I do not feel as though these requests were asking for too much ... To be crystal 
clear, I was not looking for veto power over the next hire; I just wanted to be kept in the loop and add value 
and comments on any prospective candidates ... You and your committee of three talked to some coaches 
and made a critical decision about who you were going to hire without input from knowledgeable people 
who care about the program ... You do not have the skills to manage and cultivate new donors or the ability 
to work with coaches .. .I did not graduate from UConn, but my son Mike and his wife are UConn grads, 
and UConn did give me an honorary PhD .. .I earned my voice on this subject as your number one football 
donor/supporter, by naming the Burton Family Football Complex and by giving millions of dollars in 
scholarship money to UConn's football players and its Business School.. .I supported [the former coach's] 
football camp as a sponsor and gave thousands of dollars for additional requests for things like artwork at 
the football complex and an audio system for the player's weight room ... I am fully qualified to assess 
coaches and their ability to match up with the university's needs, and I have done so for footba11 programs 
from Vanderbilt to New Haven, as well as several schools in the Ohio Valley Conference and [the] Big 
Ten ... After this slap in the face and embarrassment to my family, we are so upset that we are out of 
UConn ... What that means is that we do not want to deal with people like you and your committee, who we 
do not trust and cannot count on to make the correct decisions or do anything right with our money ... We 
want our money and respect back ... Over the past years, the Burton family has donated over $31 million to 
support special education and scholarship programs in America .. .It is a shame that UConn will not be on 
our list going forward." Letter from Robert Burton to Jeffrey Hathaway (Jan. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.ctpost.com/sports/item/Bw1on-s-letter-to-UConn-3855.php [hereinafter Burton letter]. 
2 Neil Vigdor and Rob Varnon, UConn booster Burton: Hit man with a heart- and a football addiction, CONN. 
POST, Feb. 1, 2011, available at http://www.ctpost.com/locaVarticle/UConn-booster-Burton-Hit-man-with-a-heart-
and-989760.php - page-1. 
3 I d. As a sh1dent, Burton was the recipient of a full scholarship from his alma mater, Murray State University in 
Kentucky. He was captain of the Murray State football team, a four-year first team stm1er, and an All-American 
selection in his senior year. After graduating, he was a 19th-round selection of the San Francisco 49ers and later 
signed with the Buffalo Bills. 
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complex in 2002 that helped launch the program into Division IA, and earned Burton recognition 
as UConn's most valuable booster.4 Yet just nine years later, in 2011, on the heels of the most 
successful season in UConn football's history, Robert Burton asked for his money back.5 
A booster like Robert Burton is every college athletic program's dream. In 2006, only 19 
of the 119 total universities in the Football Bowl Subdivision netted an actual profit from their 
respective programs. 6 As an average, from 2004 to 2006, just 16 broke even. 7 With the vast 
majority ending their seasons in the red, philanthropy has become vital to the success and 
prestige of college athletic programs. Booster dollars translate to state-of-the-art facilities, top-
of-the-line equipment, and creatn-of-the-crop recn1its. This recipe for athletic success often 
spills over onto the university's plate as well, as schools reap notable benefits from sports-drawn 
media attention. 8 In this age of high-profile Division I football and basketball, where 
professional-like stakes continue to erode the amateurism of decades past, athletic departments 
feel pressure when it cotnes to cultivating- and nurturing- relationships with major donors. 9 
And as the Burton letter demonstrates, hell hath no fury like a booster scorned. When 
UConn's athletic department was seeking to fill the shoes of departing head football coach 
Randy Edsall in early 2011, and Burton was not consulted, he ignited a feud with UConn athletic 
director Jeff Hathaway that garnered national media coverage. As copies of the very expressive 
4 !d. 
5 !d. 
6 See MATTHEW DENHART ET AL., CTR. FOR COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY, THE ACADEMICS 
ATHLETICS TRADE-OFF (2009), available at http://www.centerforcollegeaffordability.org/uploads/athletics.pdf. 
7 ld 
8 For example, after Northwestern University's appearance in the 1996 Rose Bowl, the University boasted a 30% 
increase in applications for the upcoming academic year.Jd. at 6. 
9 The Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, established with the purpose of identifYing ways 
to prevent athletic programs from interfering with the academic integrity of American institutions, referred to the 
growing competition between colleges for the acquisition of resources as an "arms race." See KNIGHT FOUND. 
COMM'N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, A CALL TO ACTION: RECONNECTING COLLEGE SPORTS AND HIGHER 
EDUCATION (2001); James P. Strode, Donor Motives to Giving to Intercollegiate Athletics 1-2 (2006) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, the Ohio State University), available at 
http://etd.ohiolink.edu/sendpdf.cgi/Strode%20James%20Patrick.pdf?osu1148304953 [hereinafter "Strode"]. 
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letter were leaked to the press, Burton was pegged as ... well, a prima donor. But are multi-
million dollar boosters like Robert Burton justified in their expectation of control and influence 
over a collegiate athletic program? 
Pati I of this Note will discuss the vital role boosters play in college athletics, and will 
explain why colleges, universities and other non-profit organizations have increasingly relied 
upon the generosity of donors in recent years. Additionally, this section will explore the various 
motives that drive philanthropic giving, specifically· focusing on how power, control and 
influence may motivate major donors in college sports. 
Part II will redirect towards a discussion of the traditional legal relationships and 
conflicts arising between donors and institutions, and will stress the importance of clear donative 
intent in gift agreements. This section will also deconstruct the common law barrier to donor 
standing- an obstacle that historically prevented the merits of many donor-initiated claims from 
being heard and resolved. 
Part III will introduce the emerging phenomenon of venture philanthropy, a departure 
fron1 1nore traditional methods of charitable giving which affords donors the ability to manage 
and oversee their funds. It will include an analysis of Smithers v. St. Luke 's/Roosevelt Hospital, 
a landmark case for donor standing, specifically focusing on what constitutes a "special interest" 
in a charitable organization. 
Finally, this Note will compare and contrast collegiate boosters like Robert Burton with 
venture philanthropists and other donors who reserve managerial rights for themselves when 
conferring gifts to institutions. It will conclude by finding that, despite the growing need for 
financial assistance from donors in collegiate athletics, accepting certain restricted gifts - those 
5 
BUYING INFLUENCE IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS: HOW MUCH DOES IT COST TO PUT IN YOUR TWO CENTS? 
Amanda Leone 
with considerably tight strings attached - may only serve to further erode the integrity and 
amateurism of the NCAA. 
I. Modern Donors: The Trend Towards Control 
Due to our nation's current economic climate, American tmiversities, charitable 
foundations and other non-profit entities have experienced a significant decline in funding from 
state and local govermnents. 10 In response to the downturn, these institutions have been forced 
to seek alternative financial resources. 11 College athletic departments are especially susceptible 
to the sting of inadequate funding, as the expenses of the majority of college sports programs 
substantially outweigh revenues. 12 Approximately 75% of NCAA Division I programs lose 
money annually, while the expenses necessary to maintain competitiveness continue to increase 
each year. 13 To close the funding gap, athletic departments have increasingly relied upon 
philanthropic giving. 14 For instance, in 1965, donations from boosters accounted for 5o/o of 
athletic revenues. But today, donors contribute nearly 20%. 15 
Soliciting contributions from donors has become vital to the success and sustainability of 
not only college athletic progratns, but charities and non-profits as well. As such, these 
institutions continually strive to understand the psychology of philanthropic giving. 
Philanthropy as we understand it today is a relatively new concept. In the United States, the 
practice emerged and developed in the 20th century with the establishment of private 
foundations by industrial giants like Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller. 16 Yet these champions of 
10 Strode, supra note 9, at 1. 
11 Jd. 
12 ld. 
13 ld. 
14 ld. 
15 !d. 
16 See Alan F. Rothchild, Jr., How Donors May- and May Not-Exercise Control ofCharitable Gifts, 16 
TXNEXEMPT 110 (2004) [hereinafter Rothchild]. 
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industry did ·not give with both hands - rather, wealthy donors traditionally utilized private 
foundations as a means of retaining control over their charitable gifts. 17 In lieu of donating 
assets directly to an institution or organization, establishing a private foundation afforded donors 
the ability to oversee the management and distribution of their ftmds. 18 Though the practice and 
advent of philanthropy in our society is far more widespread than it was during Rockefeller's 
time, donors of the 21st century are becoming increasingly demanding with respect to control 
and management of their gifts. 19 In the view of one commentator, "society has moved and is 
continuing to move toward a results-oriented, quasi-commercial, social engineer's conception of 
charity."20 
To gain perspective on why this attitudinal shift in philanthropy has occurred, and 
perhaps begin to understand UConn football booster Robert Burton's outrage, it is helpful to 
examine the theories behind why people give in the first place. In recent decades, numerous 
studies have been conducted to measure donor motivation.21 Specifically, "[t]he instruments 
developed by sport researchers have focused on a range of motives for giving, from psychosocial 
constructs such as feelings of loyalty to tangible benefits such as preferential seating for football 
games. "22 A 2006 study conducted at a large, football-oriented Midwestern university developed 
a model that narrowed the range of athletic booster motives to just four: achievement, affiliation, 
17 ld. 
18 Jd. 
19 Jd. 
20 This social shift reflects the quasi-professional shift that has occurred in collegiate athletics. Programs are 
becoming increasingly "results-oriented," and many commentators argue that big-time Division I football and men's 
basketball programs are teetering on the verge of commercialization. 
21 See, e.g., J.E. BILLING ET. AL., ATHLETIC FUND-RAISING: EXPLORING THE MOTIVES BEHIND DONATIONS (1985); 
E.J. Staurowsky, B. Parkhouse, and M. Sachs, Developing An Instrument to Measure Athletic Donor Behavior and 
Motivation, 10 J. SPORT MANAGEMENT 262, 262-277 (1996); J.M. Gladden et. al., Toward a Better Understanding 
of College Athletic Donors: What Are the Primary Motives? 14(1) SPORT MARKETING Q. 18, '18-30 (2005) 
[hereinafter "Gladden"]. 
22 Strode, supra note 9, at 33. 
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philanthropy, and power.23 According to the study's results, achievement ranked the highest 
among the four, leading the researchers to conclude that "donors give money in an effort to 
fulfill vicarious triumphs concurrent with successful athletic squads."24 Affiliation, which links 
charitable giving with a donor's sense of belonging, came in second place?5 The philanthropy 
motive, which sought to measure the number of donors giving without expecting something in 
return, ranked third. 26 Power ranked last among the four motives, suggesting that at this 
particular university, the donors surveyed did not have an especially strong expectation of a quid 
pro quo relationship with the institution?7 
This finding, that power ranks lowest among donor motives 1n college athletics, is 
s01nething of an anomaly. Despite its low ranking, researchers and analysts studying donor 
motivation do not discotmt power as a viable "hidden" motive. Because the majority of research 
conducted on donor motivation relies upon the honesty of respondents, it is reasonable that the 
stigma attached to the "desire for power" deters participants from speaking truthfully?8 "[I]t 
may be viewed as faux pas to divulge the reason for engaging in philanthropic behavior is to gain 
power. People may wish to think that their gift is an altruistic gesture, rather than a selfish act 
for personal gain."29 Other studies on philanthropic motivation support the theory that great 
contribution and great expectation go hand-in-hand. Research conducted by the Center on 
Philanthropy at Indiana University concluded that, while motives for giving are consistent along 
the economic spectrum from poor to wealthy, when major donors contribute 1najor dollars 
toward a purpose of their choice, "they invariably want to shape rather than merely support" that 
23 See generally, Gladden, supra note 21. 
24 Strode, supra note 9, at 82. 
25 Jd. at 83. 
26 ld. at 84. 
27 ld. 
28 ld. at 85. 
29 /d. 
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cause.30 
Ample evidence from the world of college sports, including the Burton letter, supports the 
hypothesis that some donors give to athletic programs with an tmspoken expectation of access 
and influence. When that agenda is exposed, however, donors and institutions alike may feel 
repercussions - be they mere disapproving jeers from the sports community, or full-scale 
sanctions from the NCAA. In 2005, Logan Yotmg, an athletics booster at the University of 
Alabama was convicted of bribery in federal court for using his financial influence to seek out 
top high school recn1its for the University. 31 Most recently, and most notoriously, former 
University of Miami football booster Nevin Shapiro allegedly doled out thousands of proscribed 
benefits to at least 72 Miami football players from 2002 through 2010.32 It is wholly plausible 
that the stigma created by these public scandals involving illicit boosters would deter an average 
donor from admitting even their slightest expectation of access and influence. Nevertheless, as 
evidenced by both research and real-world prototypes, the power motive is not to be discounted. 
Yet not all power-thirsty donors cause headaches for their respective institutions and the 
NCAA. In fact, quid pro quo donations in college sports are not unheard of. Many athletics 
booster clubs have developed some sort of progressive scale of dollar amounts, guaranteeing 
perks like special seating, tickets, or even an invitation to the team banquet at the end of the 
season in exchange for a specified donation amount. But what dollar amount actually buys a 
donor influence over the program? 
30 Paul G. Schervish, lvfajor Donors, lvfajor Motives: The People and Purposes Behind Major Gifts, in 16 NEW 
DIRECTIONS FOR PHILANTHROPIC GIVING 85, 86 (Dwight F. Burlingame, Timothy L. Seiler, Eugene R. Tempel eds., 
1997), available at http://www.bc.edu/contentldam/files/research_sites/cwp/pd£'majordonors.pdf. 
31 Strode, supra note 10, at 84. 
32 The numerous benefits Shapiro provided to players at the University of Miami included "cash, jewelry, prostitutes, 
parties in his mansions and on his yacht, elaborate meals and nights out at expensive nightclubs and strip bars, 
bonuses for athlete's play on the field, special bonuses for injuring players on another team, and, in one instance, an 
abortion for a stripper a player had impregnated." U. of Miami's 'Booster Bombshell': 'The Craziest Scandal in 
NCAA HistOJy', THE WEEK (Aug. 19,2011,1:13 PM), http://theweek.com/article/index/218426/u-of-miamis-
booster-bom bsh ell-the-craziest-scandal-in-ncaa-history. 
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II. Donor vs. Institution: Legal Relationships and Disputes 
Typically, the process of making a major gift to a college, university, or other non-profit 
organization does not merely consist of writing, signing and handing over a multi-million dollar 
check. Accounting for the institution's needs as well as the donor's preference, gifts may be 
either designated for a specific purpose or unrestricted, given without any strings attached and 
available to use as the institution sees fit. 33 Often, when a donor decides to make a major 
financial contribution, he intends the gift to be used for a specific purpose.34 A donor is free to 
dictate his own specific purpose for a gift, such as the construction of a new building, support for 
a particular program, or whatever else he chooses.35 However, the institution is not required to 
accept a restricted gift that it does not intend to honor.36 "[I]n practice most major gifts are 
negotiated agreements between the donor and the nonprofit's executive or board leadership."37 
Institutions recognize the importance of discussing gift restrictions with major donors prior to 
accepting their contributions, and the necessity of preserving the terms in a written gift 
instrument to avoid future mistmderstandings.38 
Under the Restatement of Property, donor intent is the paramotmt consideration when 
interpreting a gift instrument.39 The provisions a donor chooses to include in a gift agreement 
are particularly valuable to the determination of a gift's identity, as remedies available to both 
donor and donee are contingent upon a court's interpretation of the donative document. If a 
donor chooses to give an unrestricted gift to an institution, it is presumed that the donor gives 
33 JULIA I. WALKER, NONPROFIT ESSENTIALS: MAJOR GIFTS 3 (2006). 
34 I d. at 2. 
35 ld. 
36 !d. at 4. 
37 ld. 
38 ld. 
39 Restatement (Third) of Property, § 10.1 (2003). 
10 
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with both hands and relinquishes all interest and control upon the gift's completion.40 In contrast, 
a trust is created when a donor manifests his will to create a fiduciary relationship between 
himself and a trustee, and the donor subjects the trustee to a duty to use the trust for a stated 
purpose.41 Finally, if a donor chooses to attach express conditions to his gift, the donee's interest 
may be subject to forfeiture or reversion in the event that the donee fails to meet the 
requiren1ents or conditions set forth by the donor in the deed of gift.42 
When it is uncertain whether the provisions in a gift agreement create a trust or restricted 
gift, courts generally favor an interpretation of the former over the latter. 43 As one court 
explained, ''[b ]ecause forfeiture is a harsh remedy, any ambiguity is resolved against it."44 In the 
event that a condition is breached, however, the required legal remedy is forfeiture. 45 Thus, 
where a document's language is ambiguous as to donor intent, courts opt to constnw the 
instrument in a manner that will more effectively confer a benefit to the public. 46 However, if a 
donor clearly manifests his intent to create a restricted gift, that intention will be honored.47 
In L. B. Research and Education Foundation v. UCLA Foundation, a California court 
grappled with the question of whether a deed of gift constituted a charitable trust or restricted 
gift.48 In that case, a donor had contributed $1 million to UCLA for the establishment of an 
40 The Law Of Tmsts And Tn1stees § 324. 
41 !d. 
42 !d. 
43 !d. 
44 L.B. Research & Educ. Found. v. UCLA Found., 130 Cal. App. 4th 171, 178 (2005). 
45 The Law Of Tmsts And Tmstees § 324 ("Courts of equity are hostile to conditions and the harsh forfeitures which 
they involve."). 
46 !d. 
47 I d. at 178; While the law requires that courts utilize a donor's intention as their compass in determining the 
meaning of a deed of gift, there is dissention among courts and commentators over the extent to which outside 
documents and testimony, i.e., extrinsic evidence, may be used to ascertain the donor's intention. The majority 
fosters the "plain meaning nlle," which prohibits extrinsic evidence from being introduced to contradict the plain 
meaning of the instmment's words. 
48 L.B. Research, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 171. 
11 
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endowed chair at UCLA's medical school. 49 When the plaintiff Foundation felt that the 
conditions attached to the gift had been ignored, it filed suit against the University and demanded 
that the ftmds be transferred to the University of California, San Francisco, School of 
Medicine. 50 Upon UCLA's motion for dismissal, the court was forced to delineate the 
differences between a charitable trust and a conditional gift in order to rule on the motion. 51 
Citing the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, the court defined "charitable tn1st" as the 
intentional creation of a fiduciary relationship between donor and trustee, and identified intent, 
trust res, and charitable purpose as the elements necessary for its creation. 52 It went on to 
contrast that definition with elements for the establishment of a restricted gift: "The gift will be 
construed as one of a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent if it is expressly provided in 
the instrument that the transferee shall forfeit it or that the transferor or his heir or a third party 
person n1ay enter for breach of the condition. "53 
In rendering its decision and ascertaining the intent of the parties, the court was required 
to rely upon the "writing as a whole" and concluded that the instrument indeed conferred a 
restricted gift. 54 According to the court, the writing demonstrated an intent that the fund revert to 
a contingent donee in the event that UCLA did not use it for its designated purpose. 55 The court 
concluded that L.B. Research intended to impose an enforceable obligation on UCLA to use the 
49 Jd. at 175. 
50 I d. at 176-77 (' 1[T]he UCLA Foundation and the Regents had failed to employ personnel meeting the criteria of 
the Chair; failed to account to L.B. Research; offered the Chair to non-qualified individuals and, over the objection 
of L.B. Research and the Attorney General of the State of California, elected an unqualified person to the Chair; 
withdrawn unearned fees from the Chair's ftmd; and refused to deliver the Chair's fund to the Department of Surgery 
at the University of California, San Francisco, School of Medicine."). 
51 ld. 
52 I d. at 177. 
53 !d. at 178; Restatement (Second) ofTmsts § 11. 
54 L.B. Research, 130 Cal.App 4th at 179. 
55 ld. 
12 
BUYING INFLUENCE IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS: HOW MUCH DOES IT COST TO PUT IN YOUR TWO CENTS? 
Amanda Leone 
money in accordance with the stated conditions. 56 The University contested, however, that 
because the gift agreement did not contain an express forfeiture provision, it could not be 
construed as a restricted gift. 57 The court responded by noting that, although UCLA's failure to 
abide by the conditions outlined in the gift agreement would not necessarily constitute a 
forfeiture for the "entire University of California system", 58 it would nevertheless constitute a 
forfeiture for UCLA's medical school, the institution specifically designated by the Foundation 
as the donee. 59 As L.B. Research shows, the manner in which a court construes the language of a 
gift instrument and interprets donative intent may significantly impact not only the re1nedies 
available to a plaintiff donor, but, more importantly, whether the 1nerits of the donor's claim will 
survive a defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Though it seems to contradict the deference given to donor intent discussed in the 
previous section, a donor lacks standing at common law to enforce the terms of a completed gift 
unless he or she expressly reserves the right to do so. 60 This provision may appear in an 
instrument as a right of reverter or a right to redirect. Thus, to effectively bring a private lawsuit 
and reclaim his funds, hypothetically, Robert Burton's deed of gift to UConn would have had to 
contain not only a provision reserving him the right to be consulted during the coach selection 
process, but also a reversion. If a gift instrument does not contain such language, however, an 
aggrieved donor's only hope for recourse rests with the attorney general, who, at common law, 
has the authority to enforce the provisions of a donative instnlffient.61 
56 L.B. Research, 130 Cal.App. 4th at 179 (citing City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, 70 Cal. App. 4th 
613, 622 (1999)). 
57 ld. 
58 L.B. Research, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 179-80. 
59 I d. at 180 ("Because UCLA's loss will be UC San Francisco's gain, the nature of this forfeiture supports rather 
than defeats L.B. Research's position and does not require adoption of a view antagonistic to the donor's charitable 
intent."). 
60 Restatement (Second), Trusts § 348, comment (f), p. 212 (1959). 
61 Restatement (Second), Trusts § 348. 
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The power delegated to the attorney general to enforce charitable gifts stems from the 
English common law notion of the Crown as parens patriae. 62 Historically, the Crown bore the 
exclusive responsibility to "facili[tate] the alleviation of suffering among its most vulnerable 
subjects," and, as an agent for the Crown, the attorney general was burdened with the duty of 
enforcing charitable gifts. 63 This state interest in the enforcement of charitable funds resonates 
today, as the common law remains an important source of authority for state attorneys general to 
enforce donor intent. 64 "Where property is given to a charitable corporation and it is directed by 
the terms of the gift to devote the property to a particular one of its purposes, it is under a duty, 
enforceable at the suit of the Attorney General, to devote the property to that purpose."65 
In recent decades, however, the attorney general's role in the enforcement of charitable 
gifts has been criticized as antiquated and inadequate. 66 The offices of attorneys general are 
notoriously understaffed and tmderftmded, and the duties of this public official extend far beyond 
mere oversight of charitable gifts. 67 But while the expansion of individual standing to bring 
enforcement suits would potentially alleviate this problem, cotuis have been reluctant to grant 
standing to private parties for fear of unnecessary lawsuits that would likely drain charitable 
assets. 68 Because public benefit is the essence of a public charity, it is rational to conclude that 
these organizations "must be protected from harassment and loss. "69 Thus, courts have been 
wary to open their doors to private parties who lack a tangible stal<:e in the charitable property.70 
62 Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society Vs. Donor Empowerment, 58 V AND. L. 
REV. 1093, 1136 (2005) [hereinafter Goodwin]. 
63 ld. 
64 Jd.; Restatement (Second), Trusts§ 391. 
65 Restatement (Second), Trusts § 348. 
66 Goodwin, supra note 62, at 1138. 
67 Jd. at 1139. 
68 Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752, 756 (N.Y. 1985). 
69 Goodwin, supra note 62, at 1140. 
70 ld. 
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Some state coutis, however, have opted to relax standing requirements as they pertain to 
beneficiaries of a charitable trust or gift on a subjective basis by implementing the special 
interest doctrine. 71 A court may invoke the special interest doctrine to determine whether a 
plaintiffs affiliation with a charity entitles him to standing. 72 Factors weighed by the court 
include: the act(s) spurring the cause of action, the remedy sought by the plaintiff, fraud or 
n1isconduct by the charity or its directors, the nature of the benefitted class and its relationship to 
the charity, and the attorney general's availability or effectiveness. 73 
Had the court in L.B. Research and Education Foundation v. UCLA Foundation 
interpreted the donative instnlll1ent as a tn1st rather than a restricted gift, the Foundation's 
opportunity for judicial remedy would have been diminished- at least in some capacity. The 
Foundation would have been required to conjure some additional arguments and justifications to 
establish its standing without the aid of the attorney general. The court actually presented those 
would-be arguments sua sponte, and determined that even if the language of the donative 
docllll1ent were read to construct a charitable tn1st, the Foundation would nonetheless be entitled 
to individual standing to sue because it satisfied the qualifications of an interested party. 74 
Conceptually, a lawsuit brought by a party that demonstrates the requisite special interest in an 
institution's objectives is less likely to be frivolous. 75 For this reason, courts have become 
increasingly comfotiable granting standing to beneficiaries and other interested parties who seek 
"to uphold the best interests of the charity."76 Despite this kink in the general nile, when it 
71 !d. at 1141. 
72 Restatement (Second), Tn1sts § 391. 
73 !d. 
74 L.B. Research, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 180. 
75 /d. at 180-81. 
76 Goodwin, supra note 62, at 1142, 1148 ("In the past, the courts automatically accorded [founders and endowers] a 
power of 'visitation' to supervise their gifts once given, treating the reservation of visitorial power as inherent in the 
endowing of a corporate charity. The early cases based the doctrine on the power every one has to dispose, direct, 
and regulate his own property. Today, we do not recognize that property given by a donor to charity remains in any 
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comes to donor-initiated suits, courts have, for the most part, elected to stick to the com1non law 
decree that the attorney general is the designated enforcer of charitable gifts. 77 Moreover, state 
legislatures typically have refused to afford statutory relief to individual donors vexed by the 
standing problem.78 
Prior to the creation of a concise set of uniform laws, an ambivalent mix of trust law, 
corporate law and contract law governed disputes arising between donors and institutions. 79 The 
inconsistent application of these doctrines, however, proved to be "disadvantageous for both the 
donors and the charitable institutions receiving their gifts."8° For instance, governing boards and 
trustees typically enjoyed greater freedom under a corporate standard, but were confined to very 
strict parameters under trust law.81 As a result of these judicial inconsistencies, much of the 
pertinent case law was reduced to "a series of seemingly disjointed cases that made it difficult for 
goven1ing boards and their attorneys to predict judicial judgment. "82 
On the plaintiff donor's end, the odds of choosing a "winning" offensive strategy to 
enforce the terms of his or her gift were equally dubious, and the problem was compounded by 
the fact that ''donors did not have, and still do not have, standing to sue a charity for non-
sense 'his own.' Nevertheless, there was a rationale for allowing such rights. A founder had a natural reason to know 
and care about the charity's operations. Also, permitting him to sue would not expose the charity to vexatious 
litigation from indifferent members of the public."). 
77 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 348 cmt. f. (''Where property is given to a charitable corporation and it is 
directed by the tenus of the gift to devote the property to a particular one ofi1s purposes, it is under a duty, 
enforceable at the suit of the Attorney General, to devote the property to that purpose."); But see L.B. Research and 
Educ. Foundation v. UCLA Foundation, 130 Cal. App. 4th 171 (2005), where court deemed plaintiff donor was 
entitled to standing as a responsible individual with a legitimate interest in the charitable trust. 
78 Goodwin, supra note 62, at 1143; See, e.g., Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 996 
(1997). 
79 Rachel M. Williams, Transitioningfrom UMJFA to UPMJFA: How the Promulgation of the Uniform Prudent 
Management of Institutional Funds Act Will Affect Donor-Initiated Lawsuits Brought Against Colleges and 
Universities, 37 J.C. & U.L. 201,205 (2010) [hereinafter Williams]. 
80 Id. 
81 Douglas M. Salaway, UMIFA and a Model For Endowment Investing, 22 J.C. & U.L. 1045, 1064 (1996) 
[hereinafter Salaway ]. 
82 Id. at 1065. 
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compliance with donor-imposed restrictions." 83 Despite the slim chance that a court would 
actually hear the merits of their claims, many donors nevertheless turned to the courts for remedy 
only to be dismissed for lack of standing. 84 And still, in the limited number of instances where a 
donor was able to get a foot in the door and voice their grievances, it was the courts' tendency to 
extend protection to the defendant institution. 85 
To encourage uniformity and consistency in the governance of funds given by donors to 
institutions, forty-eight states plus the District of Colu1nbia have adopted statutes based upon 
regulations created and endorsed by the Uniform Law Commission. 86 The first unifonn law 
constructed to guide the investment and management of charitable gifts, the Uniform 
Management of Institutional Funds Act ("UMIF A"), was drafted in 1972. 87 UMIF A was 
revolutionary in that it established, for the first time, '\miform and fundamental n1les for the 
invest1nent of funds held by charitable institutions and the expenditure of :fi.mds donated as 
'endowments' to those institutions."88 
In an attempt to ameliorate conflicts between plaintiff donors and defendant institutions 
regarding donative intent and gift restrictions, the Uniform Law Commission drafted UMIF A to 
83 Williams, supra note 79, at 207; 2 Restatement (Second), Tn1sts § 348, comment (f), p. 212 (1959) ("Where 
property is given to a charitable corporation and it is directed by the terms of the gift to devote the property to a 
particular one of its purposes, it is under a duty, enforceable at the suit of the Attorney General, to devote the 
property to that purpose."). 
84 Williams, supra note 79, at 228 ("The most highly litigated issue seems to be whether there is donor standing to 
bring a lawsuit to object to the use of funds or enforce a restriction."). 
85 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coli. v. Quincy, 258 N.E.2d 745, 753 (Mass. 1970) (Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, Norfolk court refused to enforce a donor's gift restrictions despite the fact that the donor expressly 
intended for those provisions to be mandatory); See also Wilbur v. Univ. ofVt., 270 A.2d 889 (Vt. 1970) (Supreme 
Court of Vermont held that a university's violation of the terms of a gift agreement "(did] not entitle the settlor or 
his successor to enforce" the restrictions outlined in the instrument). 
86 The Uniform Law Commission "provides states with non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted legislation 
that brings clarity and stability to critical areas of the law." Uniform Law Commission, http:// 
www.nccusl.org/Update/ (Oct. 11, 2011). 
87 UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (Nat'l Conference ofComm'rs on Unif. State Laws 1972). 
88 Uniform Law Commission, History of UPMIF A and UMIF A, 
http://upmifa.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=2&tabid=69 (Oct. 11, 2011 ). 
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strike a balance between the interests of donors and institutions.89 To accommodate charitable 
institutions bestowed with gifts bearing impracticable provisions, UMIF A permitted the release 
of donor-imposed restrictions in certain circumstances.9° Conversely, to safeguard donor intent, 
particular regulations imposed by UMIF A could be limited or even annulled by a written 
agreement between the parties. 91 In general, however, the overarching aim of the Uniform Law 
Com1nission in drafting UMIF A was to ensure that "funds held by charitable institutions [were] 
1nanaged and used prudently and according to the donor's intentions without deterring the 
operation of the charity or unduly restricting its ability to respond to changes in the world."92 
In 2006, the Uniform Law Commission gave UMIF A a facelift, revamping and updating 
the laws governing the 1nanagement and investment of institutional funds by promulgating the 
Unifonn Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act ("UPMIFA"). 93 While UPMIFA's 
priinary goal is not dissimilar to UMIFA's, the new Act ~·modernized" its predecessor in several 
respects. 94 Notably, the 2006 revision sought to liberalize the conditions under which donor-
imposed restrictions can be modified by a charitable institution. Under the original provisions of 
UMIF A, an institution was unable to rely upon the courts for legal modification or release of 
donor-imposed restrictions. While a restriction can be modified or released by merely obtaining 
written consent from the donor, in practice, "obtaining donor consent can be impossible, at worst, 
89 Williams, supra note 79, at 208. 
90 UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT§ 7 (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws 
1972). 
91 See, e.g., UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT§§ 3, 4, 5 (Nat'l Conference ofComm'rs on Unif. 
State Laws 1972); UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT§§ 3(a), 3(e), 4(a), 4(b) (Nat'l 
Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws 2006). The UMIFA considered any writing that ~'establishes the terms 
of the gift" to be an authoritative "gift instrument." UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT§ 1 cmt. 
(Nat' I Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws 1972). 
92 Williams, supra note 79, at 208. 
93 2 Restatement (Second), Trusts§ 348, comment (f), p. 212 (1959). 
94 Williams, supra note 79, at 208. 
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or extremely burdensome, at least."95 To rectify this matter, the Uniform Law Commission 
chose to supplement UPMIFA's provisions with the trust doctrines of cy pres and equitable 
deviation. 96 The incorporation of these doctrines was intended not only to broaden the scope of 
judicial remedy available to institutions paralyzed by donor-imposed gift restrictions, but to 
foster ~~an approach that favors modification over release to protect donor intent."97 
Yet despite the Uniform Laws' mutual missions to 1nitigate conflicts between donors and 
institutions, in the years since its original enactment and its 2006 revitalization, donors have 
rarely relied upon UMIF A or UPMIF A in bringing lawsuits against colleges and universities. 
Rather, donors who actually see their claims survive to trial have reverted to more traditional 
principles of contract law, trust law, or corporate law to back the substance of their suits.98 The 
use of these legal doctrines "precludes the use of UMIF A's principles of interpretation in any 
way because contract, trust, or corporate law will be applied in a manner corresponding to the 
parties' characterization of the case."99 In the vast majority of cases, however, donors are unable 
to advance the ball far enough to even utilize an offensive strategy. Lack of standing is an 
aggrieved donor's most formidable opponent, and as a result, the substantive issues underlying a 
donor's clailn for enforcement of the terms of a gift are rarely adjudicated. In order for the 
merits of donor-initiated lawsuits to be heard and remedied, donors first must find a way to clear 
95 I d. at 214. 
96 UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT§ 6(c) (Nat'l Conference ofComm'rs on Unif. 
State Laws 2006); JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 701 (3d ed., 
Foundation Press 2007) (1998) (Using cy pres, a court is able to modify, in some way, a donor's instruction on the 
use or purpose of a gift. However, any modifications sought by an institution as to the purpose of a donor's gift 
must be consistent with the donor's intent as articulated in the gift instrument. A court's decision to apply the 
doctrine of cy pres in trust law is dependent upon the charitable institution's ability to demonstrate: (1) that the gift 
was given "to a charitable organization for a charitable purpose"; (2) that it is "impossible, impractical or illegal to 
carry out the donor's stated charitable purpose"; and (3) "that the donor had general charitable intent."); Williams, 
supra note 79, at 217 ("Equitable deviation applies tmder virtually the same circumstances as cy pres, except that it 
applies not to the purpose of a fund but to the means used to carry out that purpose."). 
97 Susan N. Gary, Charities} Endowments} and Donor Intent: The Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional 
Funds Act, 41 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1328 (2007) [hereinafter Gary]. 
98 ld. 
99 I d. at 229. 
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the hurdle of standing. As demonstrated by the Supreme Court of Connecticut's decision in Carl 
J Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, however, the Uniform Laws are of little 
utility. 
In 1997, the Supreme Court of Connecticut reaffirmed the preeminence of the common 
law standard when it held that the Carl J. Herzog Foundation lacked standing to enforce the 
terms of its $250,000 gift to the University of Bridgeport. 10° For some time prior to the cause of 
action, the Carl J. Herzog Foundation (herein "Foundation") gave money to Bridgeport 
University (herein "University") to provide merit-based scholarships to disadvantaged students 
demonstrating an interest in the medical field. 101 On August 12, 1986, the Folmdation wrote a 
letter to the University agreeing to participate in a "matching grant program" that essentially 
extended their previously established donor-donee relationship. 102 In the letter, the Foundation 
expressly outlined its intent that the fi..mds go to "disadvantaged students for medical related 
education on a continuing basis."103 Several weeks later, on September 9, 1986, the Foundation 
received an acceptance letter from the University in which it agreed to a $250,000 grant match 
anangement. 104 
Over a period of two years, both parties fi..Ilfilled their respective obligations. 105 The 
University raised the agreed-upon sum of $250,000, and the Folmdation matched it, paying 
$144,000 in Jlme 1987 and $106,000 approximately one year later. 106 In accordance with the 
Foundation's wishes, the grant money was used to provide scholarships to students enrolled in 
10° Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 996 (1997). 
101 Herzog Found., 699 A.2d at 996. 
102 ld. 
103 Jd. 
104 Jd. 
105 ld. 
106 ld. 
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the University's nursing program. 107 In June 1991, however, the University closed its nursing 
school. 108 The Foundation filed suit against the University requesting a "temporary and 
pennanent injunction [and] ordering the defendant to segregate from its general funds matching 
grants totaling $250,000."109 The Foundation also demanded an accounting for the fund and 
insisted that it be reestablished in conformance with the purposes expressed in the original gift 
instru1nent. 11 0 The complaint further asserted that if the University could not satisfy the terms of 
the original agreement, the ftmds were to be redirected to the Bridgeport Area Foundation. 111 
This case presents one of the rare examples where a plaintiff donor attempted to pre1nise 
both the substance of its claim as well as its entitlement to standing on a state's adoption of 
UMIF A. 112 In its complaint, the Foundation articulated its belief that the institutional funds had 
been intennixed with University's general funds, and that the money was not being used in 
accordance with the tenns of the gift instrument. 113 Following an initial dismissal of the 
Foundation's suit at trial for lack of standing and the appellate court's subsequent reversal, the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut was confronted with the task of determining whether the state 
legislature, by adopting UMIF A, intended to arm charitable donors with standing to enforce the 
terms of a completed gift when the gift instrument in question "contained no express reservation 
of control over the disposition of the gift."114 
Reiterating the Restatement (Second) of Tn1sts and citing case law from an array of 
jurisdictions, the Herzog court reaffirmed the com1non law principle that unless a donor 
expressly retained a right of control expressed as a restricted gift, the attorney general was vested 
107 Herzog Found., 699 A.2d at 996. 
108 ld. 
109 ld. 
110 Jd. 
111 Jd. 
112 I d. (In this specific case, the Connecticut Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act, or "CUMIFA"). 
113 Herzog Found., 699 A.2d at 996. 
114 Jd. at 997. 
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with the exclusive authority to bring an action to remedy the mishandling of a trust. 115 The court 
concluded that the Connecticut legislature did not intend for the Uniform Act to supplant the 
common law. 116 Specifically, the court cited a comtnent authored by UMIFA's drafters, which 
stated: "The donor has no right to enforce the restriction, no interest in the fund and no power to 
change the beneficiary of the fund. He may only acquiesce in a lessening of a restriction already 
in effect."117 As such, the Foundation was denied standing. 
Although donors sought to find relief in UMIF A and UPMIF A, the uniform laws have 
been of little utility to aggrieved donors seeking to direct and control the use of a completed, 
unrestricted gift. A plaintiff donor lacks standing at comtnon law to enforce the terms of a 
completed gift unless he expressly reserves the right to do so in the gift instrument negotiated 
-vvith the donee institution. Thus, to avoid conflicts regarding the terms of a gift agreetnent, it is 
itnperative that before completing a donation, the terms and expectations of the gift are discussed 
and settled by the parties. If an institution or organization willingly accepts a restricted gift, 
however, they become legally obligated to enforce and abide by the terms of that gift. 118 
III. Venture Philanthropy, Special Interests and a Breakthrough for Donor Standing 
Despite the growing trend towards gift control and oversight, the law remains partial to 
the brand of unconditional, no-strings-attached philanthropy. 119 This intersection - where a 
115 !d. at 998. 
116 !d. at 999-1000. 
117 I d at 1 00 1. 
118 Regardless of the amount, some restricted gifts are simply too cumbersome for institutions to accept. In 1907, 
Swarthmore College received coal lands and mineral rights worth an estimated $1-$3 million from wealthy Quaker 
AnnaT. Jeanes. At the time, Swarthmore's entire endowment was only worth $1 million. Ms. Jeanes conditioned 
her gift, however, stating in her will that Swarthmore would only receive the land if the college permanently 
"discontinue[ d] and abandon[ ed] all participation in intercollegiate athletics, sports and games." Unwilling to 
sacrifice its athletic programs, Swarthmore refused the gift. Will Treece, The Football Controversy Through the 
Ages, SWARTHMORE COLLEGE DAILY GAZETTE (Oct. 7, 2009), http:!/daily.swarthmore.edu/2009/10/07/athletics/. 
119 Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America's Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 
FORDI-IAM L. REV. 2437,2439 (2005). 
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donor's desire for control meets the law's preference for unrestricted giving - has been a 
breeding grotmd for legal battles. In spite of the law's persistent effort to foster the notion of 
unrestricted philanthropic giving and stifle the growing interest in gift control and oversight, 
donors and charitable foundations began seeking alternatives to conventional giving. "Venture 
philanthropy" is a term used to describe private donors' and foundations' inclination in recent 
years to adopt strategies and methods employed in the for-profit world. 120 Instead of 
relinquishing control upon the co1npletion of a charitable gift, a venture philanthropist's 
contribution to a non-profit organization may be premised on specific terms and conditions 
agreed upon by the parties. 121 Often, the donor retains the ability to provide business advice to 
the organization or serve in a managerial capacity. 122 
In 1971, decades before the term "venture philanthropist" was coined, Brink Smithers 
1nade a $1 0 million gift to Roosevelt Hospital123 in New York City for the establislunent of an 
alcohol rehabilitation center. 124 Per his zealous advocacy of new treatment mechanisms and his 
generous monetary gift, Mr. Smithers "affected a revolution in the treatment of alcoholism and 
brought about the professionalization of the field. " 125 In his initial letter of intent to the hospital, 
Mr. Smithers reserved significant responsibilities for himself as a donor, such as requiring that 
specific project plans and staff appointments have his approval. 126 It was Smithers' fervent 
intent to 1naintain an active role in the program. Interestingly, despite Mr. Smithers' wealth of 
personal experience as a lifelong alcoholic, he lacked any professional qualifications in the 
120 Rothchild, supra note 16, at 110. 
121 I d. at 110-11. 
122 Jd. 
123 Roosevelt Hospital later merged with St. Luke's to become "Roosevelt/St. Luke's Hospital." 
124 Mr. Smithers was not only a pioneer as a venture philanthropist, but also in his conviction that alcoholism was a 
disease. 
125 Goodwin, supra note 62, at 1096. 
126 Smithers, 281 A.D.2d at 128. 
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medical field. 127 Roosevelt Hospital nevertheless accepted the gift with its terms, and Smithers' 
vision culminated in the founding of the "Smithers Center" in New York City. 128 
In response to adverse economic conditions, including Medicaid budget cuts, the Hospital 
began to consider making changes to its alcohol rehabilitation program. 129 Specifically, it 
contemplated the sale of an Upper Eastside in-patient facility. 130 Mr. Smithers, maintaining an 
active role in the management of the program, vigilantly opposed the sale of the Upper Eastside 
house and contested that it was "integral to the program lmder the terms of his gift."131 Despite 
the escalating tension between Smithers and the Hospital regarding the gift's donative intent, the 
house was not sold during Smithers' lifetime. 132 After Smithers' death in 1995, however, the 
Hospital moved forward with its plan, and Mrs. Smithers, administratrix of her late husband's 
estate, sought the help of the Attorney General to prevent the sale. 133 Dissatisfied with his 
handling of the matter, Mrs. Smithers pursued judicial remedy in 2001.134 
The Smithers decision constitutes a turning point in donor-initiated litigation because, for 
the first time, the traditional obstacles to donor standing were circumvented. Although the New 
York Court of Appeals agreed with the· common law standard that had been adapted into state 
statutory law, it nevertheless chose to raise, sua sponte, whether the attorney general's delegated 
right to enforce charitable gifts was exclusive. 135 The court determined that the plaintiff 
127 Goodwin, supra note 62, at 1096. 
128 Smithers, 281 A.D.2d at 128. 
129 Jd. at 131. 
130 Jd. 
131 Goodwin, supra note 62, at 1097. 
132 Smithers, 281 A.D.2d at 131. 
133 ld. at 132-33. 
134Jd. 
135 Jd. at 134. 
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ad1ninistratrix, Mrs. Smithers, had standing consistent with that of the Attorney General to 
pursue her gift enforcement claim against the defendant hospital. 136 
In its analysis, the Smithers court looked to Associated Alumni of General Theological 
Seminary v. General Theological Seminary, a decision rendered by the New York Appellate 
Division and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 1900. 137 In that case, various alumni of 
General Theological Seminary had given ftmds to the institution for the purpose of endowing a 
professorship. 138 In the gift instnunent, the ahunni attached certain conditions to the endowment, 
specifically reserving a right of nomination in the event that the chair became vacant. 139 When 
conflict arose between the alumni association and the institution regarding those conditions, the 
alumni filed suit against the seminary. 140 The Appellate Division held that, due to the plaintiffs 
retention of the right of nomination, it was entitled to standing as a donor. 141 After allowing the 
alumni association standing, the court was able to address the merits of the plaintiffs claim and 
determined that the seminary had indeed violated the provisions of the gift agreement. 142 
Although the Court of Appeals upheld arguably the most important aspect of the 
Appellate Division's n11ing in Associated Alumni regarding a donor's right to standing, it altered 
the remedy of the lower court, ordering specific performance from the defendant institution 
rather than monetary refund. 143 The Court of Appeals reasoned that in order for a gift to be 
refunded to a donor, a right of reversion must be an express provision in the gift instrument. 144 
Because such a condition was not included in the alumni association's deed of gift, merely 
136 ld. at 139-40. 
137 Jd. at 136. 
138 Assoc. Alumni of the Gen. Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of Am. 
v. Gen. Theological Seminary ofthe Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States, 163 N.Y. 417,420 (1900). 
139 ld. 
140 ld. 
141 I d. at 422. 
142 ld. at 421-22. 
143 I d. at 422. 
144 Assoc. Alumni, 163 N.Y. at 421-22. 
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returning the money to the donor was an improper remedy, as doing so would viliually dissolve 
the trust. 145 Due to its reservation of nomination, however, the court held that the alumni 
association had sufficient standing to maintain its action for the gift's enforcement. 146 
In rendering the Smithers decision, the court reasoned that, although Mr. Smithers had 
not retained a reversion, he nevertheless "retained a supervisory role with respect to [his] gift and 
indeed had served in this supervisory role," not dissimilar from the right of nomination reserved 
by the donors in Associated Alumni. 147 The court articulated that Smithers' retention of an 
oversight role was therefore enough to arn1 his estate with standing to enforce the terms of his 
gift. 148 Furthermore, the court justified Mrs. Smithers' right to standing by distinguishing her 
from other disinterested plaintiffs the common law standard intended to shtm. Unlike those 
plaintiffs who may bring "vexatious litigation" against a charity despite having no tangible stake 
in the outcome, the court noted that Mrs. Smithers had played "a cn1eial role in monitoring the 
Hospital in its compliance with the terms of the gift."149 Additionally, the court observed that 
Mrs. Smithers had demonstrated far greater interest and diligence in the matter of preserving her 
late husband's mission than did the attorney general. 150 
CONCLUSION 
Relying upon the logic of the Smithers court, major donors in college sports inarguably 
demonstrate special interest and dedication to the success and prosperity of their chosen 
institution. Furthermore, certain donors and boosters indeed have the qualifications and 
experience to tnake educated, rational, informed decisions regarding the direction of an athletic 
145 Jd. 
146 I d. at 422. 
147 Goodwin, supra note 62, at 1155 
148 Smithers, 281 A.D.2d at 139. 
149 Jd. at 138-39. 
150 ld. 
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program. Robert Burton, for example, played football both collegiately and professionally, and 
may have been justified in stating that "[he is] fully qualified to assess coaches and their ability 
to match up with [UConn's] needs." 151 Advocating venture philanthropy in the realm of 
collegiate athletics would theoretically allow these interested parties - armed with a vision for a 
program's success - to permissively buy access, influence, and power through monetary 
contributions. 
Irrefutably, Burton's contribution to UConn football enhanced the program. The new 
facility became a cornerstone of the program, and was a catalyst for its rise to pr01ninence. 
Hiring an adept, qualified coach is an equally important cornerstone in shaping the direction of a 
program. Yet there remains a palpable discrepancy between the two - while we encourage and 
commend major donors for the facilities they construct and the uniforms they provide, there is 
something tmsavory about allowing a major donor to explicitly "buy" influence over coaching 
decisions at the collegiate leve1. 152 Put differently, If the NCAA is indeed attempting to preserve 
the integrity and mnateurism of college athletics, then there may be something inherently wrong 
with fostering a model of venture philanthropy, and allowing boosters to reserve supervisory and 
nomination rights in college athletics. 
On the other hand, the watchful eye of the NCAA may serve as a sufficient restriction 
allowing venture philanthropy to improve intercollegiate competition, athletic facilities, and 
coaching staffs during an economic downturn when institutions need it most. The cost of staying 
competitive in Division I athletics continues to rise each year. Given the instability of our 
151 Burton letter, supra note 1. 
152 Burton never expressly stated in his letter that he believed his monetary contributions to UConn would allow him 
to select the next football coach. His complaints related in large part to the lack of stewardship shown by UConn. 
Though most institutions recognize the importance and value of nurturing and cultivating relationships with their 
major donors, the fiduciary duty and stewardship owed to a donor upon the completion of an tmrestricted gift is 
premised entirely on good faith. 
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nation's current economic climate, colleges and tmiversities will be forced to solicit 
contributions from donors in order to sustain their athletic programs and maintain a presence in 
the Division I arms race. As research on donor motivation demonstrates, there is indeed a 
growing market for major donors seeking access and influence in college sports. If 
philanthropy's trend towards control continues, it is plausible that institutions may be inclined to 
accept restricted gifts from major donors seeking to be consulted in athletic department decisions. 
Conceptually, collegiate donors like Robert Burton are not all that different from Brink 
Smithers. Each had a special interest in their respective institutions' goal, and had a vision for 
how to best attain that goal. The only difference between these men is that Brink Smithers was 
the only one to expressly retain the right to oversee his dollars at work. Unforttu1ately for 
disgn1ntled donors like Burton, however, this is the only difference that legally matters. Until 
colleges and universities become more willing to accept restricted gifts from donors seeking 
influence and oversight, athletic departments and ad1ninistrative boards retain the right to leave 
their donors - even multi-million dollar donors like Robert Burton - out in the cold when it 
comes to decision-making. 
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